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Abstract
Based on grounded cognition theories, the current study showed that judgments about ability were regulated by the
subjects’ perceptions of their spatial height. In Experiment 1, we found that after seeing the ground from a higher rather
than lower floor, people had higher expectations about their performance on a knowledge test and assigned themselves
higher rank positions in a peer comparison evaluation. In Experiment 2, we examined the boundary conditions of the spatial
height effects and showed that it could still occur even if we employed photos rather than actual building floors to
manipulate the perceptions of spatial heights. In addition, Experiment 2 excluded processing style as an explanation for
these observations. In Experiment 3, we investigated a potential mechanism for the spatial height effect by manipulating
the scale direction in the questionnaire. Consequently, consistent with our representational dependence account, the effect
of spatial heights on ability judgments was eliminated when the mental representation of ability was disturbed by a reverse
physical representation. These results suggest that people’s judgments about their ability are correlated with their spatial
perception.
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Introduction
Researchers have argued that our mental representations of
things we are not able to see or touch may be built out of
representations derived from physical experiences with perception
[1–2]. For example, when speaking or thinking about abstract
concepts (e.g., time, power), people often recruit metaphors from
spatial concepts [3]. People talk about time or power using spatial
words (e.g., a long movie, a high status). Experimental evidences
show that priming spatial information can indeed affect the
perception of both time [4–5] and power [6]. Broadly speaking, a
wide array of research favors the view that human cognition is
shaped by sensorimotor experiences [7–10].
Ability, another abstract concept, is also often described using
spatial language (e.g., a high-ability teacher), as are time and power.
Someimplicitmetaphorsevenreflectthe association between ability
and spatial heights. For example, a common saying describes an
outstanding talent as standing out like a camel in a flock of sheep.
The association between ability and spatial heights can also be
embodied in everyday experiences. When charts of songs or books
are compiled, the winners are listed at the top; when athletes stand
on a podium to receive their medals, the champion stands higher
than the others. Although spatial positions seem from this to be cues
to ability, we have no idea what role they may play in people’s
thinking about ability. The following arguments and data will try to
discoverwhatthinkingabout seeminglyabstractconceptslikeability
has to do with perception and experience.
Traditional theories about cognition assume that abstract
concept representations in the human mind are quite distinct
from representations that are formed in modal systems by
sensorimotor information. According to these theories, abstract
concepts and knowledge only exist in the semantic memory in the
form of amodal symbols, which are generally regarded as arbitrary
codes transformed by representations in modal systems [2][11]. As
an alternative to such amodal models of mental representation,
grounded cognition rejects the representational separation be-
tween sensorimotor information and abstract concepts. Instead,
grounded cognition proposes that the amodal models of mental
representation do not really exist and that the higher level
cognitive processes that are responsible for abstract concepts can
be directly influenced by sensorimotor information without passing
through a redundant change from modal symbols to amodal
symbols. Grounded cognition thus argues that the representation
of abstract concepts often depends on the representation of
sensorimotor information and that metaphors in language are not
only communication aids but also the outer modes of internal
representations of sensorimotor information [11]. Extensive
behavioral and neural evidence from research on cognitive
neuroscience, language, social cognition, and developmental
psychology supports the grounded cognition view (for a review
see Barsalou, 2008).
Grounded cognition theory provides the necessary theoretical
background for our predictions, which involve representations of
ability and spatial height perception. Based on this grounded
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spatial heights may regulate ability judgment. Specifically, when
people are primed with a higher rather than a lower spatial height,
they will unwittingly change their representations of ability and
thus place more confidence on their answers to a general
knowledge test.
For this study we designed three experiments to examine the
extent to which perceptions of spatial heights regulate ability
judgment. In Experiment 1, we sought to determine whether
people would increase their self-confidence in a knowledge test
when seeing the ground from a higher rather than lower floor. We
predicted that such a difference would exist. The purpose of
Experiment 2 was twofold. The first goal was to examine the
boundary conditions of the phenomenon under investigation. That
is, in Experiment 2, we repeated Experiment 1 but employed
photos rather than actual building floors to manipulate the
participants’ perceptions of spatial heights. Based on a grounded
cognition perspective, we expected that the activation of spatial
heights information using pictures would produce the same effects
as obtained in Experiment 1. The second goal of Experiment 2 was
to exclude the processing style (i.e., global processing vs. local
processing) as an explanation for our observations. We predicted
that priming different processing styles would not affect the
confidence ratingina subsequent task.Furthermore,inExperiment
3 we explored whether representational dependence (i.e., abstract
concepts build on perceptual representation processes) could serve
as a conceptual underpinning of the observed effects. We expected
that the effect of priming spatial heights on ability judgments would
be eliminated or reduced when the mental representation of ability
was disturbed by a reverse physical representation.
Experiment 1
Methods
Ethics Statement. This study was reviewed and approved by
the committee for the protection of subjects at the Institute of
Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences. Written consent was
also obtained from each participant before the experiment
according to the established guidelines of the committee. This
procedure was followed in Experiments 2 and 3 as well.
Participants. Ninety-eight undergraduates (46 male, 52
female) with a mean age of 22.6 years (range =17–27 yrs)
participated in our experiment for course credit. They completed
the experiment one at a time.
Stimuli and procedure. The place where the participants
were tested was the only independent variable we manipulated.
Participants were randomly assigned to a meeting room on either
the eighth floor or the second floor of a building. The two rooms
were exactly same in all respects except for the floor, and the
heights from the ground to the windows were respectively 30
meters and 6 meters. Once the participants arrived they were
instructed to stand by the appointed window and fix their eyes on
the outside ground for three minutes, ostensibly to eliminate
emotions. Note that the windows at which the participants stood
were located at a consistent position in the different rooms. The
weather during the experiment was sunny and the outside visibility
was good (more than 10 km). All participants next took the same
10-item general knowledge questionnaire, which involved four
knowledge domains (e.g., geography, history, philosophy, sports).
The questions were presented in the form of binary choices. An
example of the questions is:
Which country is larger? (Check one):
_____ (a) Congo
_____ (b) Zambia
When they had finished all the questions, the participants were
asked to estimate how many questions she or he had answered
correctly on the questionnaire. The difference between the
expected number and the actual number of the correct answers
provided an index of the degree of overconfidence. For example, if
a participant believed that he had answered six of the questions
correctly, when in fact he had gotten only four correct, then he
had overestimated his score by two points. This is the most
common method for measuring overconfidence [12]. Next,
participants answered the following ranking question: Among a
random sample of undergraduates, what percentage would you
expect to have fewer correct answers than you on the above test?
Participants then indicated their mood (‘‘How do you feel right
now’’) on a 9-point scale (1= very unhappy, 9= very happy). The
experimenter probed participants for suspicion about the true
purpose of the exercise and then debriefed them. No participant
appeared to be aware of the purpose of the study.
Results and Discussion
An ANOVA revealed no significant differences in the actual
number of correct answers between the higher floor (M=5.51,
SD=1.32) and the lower floor (M=5.71, SD=1.33), F (1, 96)=.53,
p=.468, gp
2=.006. However, we found significant differences in
the expected number of correct answers, F (1, 96)=9.44, p=.003,
gp
2=.090. As we predicted, participants on the higher floor
reported a higher number of expected correct answers (M=5.94,
SD=1.83) than participants on the lower floor (M=4.88,
SD=1.56). Furthermore, we calculated the degree of overconfi-
dence for each participant by subtracting the actual number from
the expected number. Consistent with our hypothesis, participants
on the higher floor expressed more confidence on their answers
(Mdifference=.43, SD=2.23) than participants on the lower floor
(Mdifference=2.82, SD=1.96), F (1, 96)=8.70, p=.004, gp
2=.083. In
fact, twenty-six out of forty-seven participants on the higher floor
showed overconfidence (i.e., the difference score was positive)
(55%); whereas only thirteen out of fifty-one participants on the
lower floor showed overconfidence (25%), x
2=9.08, p,.01. The
results of the ranking question also supported our conjecture.
Participants on the higher floor marked higher ranks for themselves
(M=53.30%, SD=13.56%) than participants on the lower floor
(M=46.76%,SD=15.13%),F(1,96)=5.04,p=.027,gp
2=.050.In
addition, no significant differences in mood states were reported
between the two floor conditions (Mhigh=5.30, SD=1.59 vs.
Mlow=5.41, SD=1.37), F (1, 96)=.15, p=.704, gp
2=.002, indicat-
ing that the mood of the participants did not change as a function of
the building floor.
Consistent with our hypothesis, when participants were assigned
to a meeting room on the different floors of a building, the
perceptions of spatial heights appear to have regulated their ability
judgment. Specifically, when seeing the ground from a higher
floor, people increased their expectations about their performance
on a knowledge test and assigned themselves higher rank positions
in a peer comparison evaluation.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 revealed an association between higher spatial
height and higher ability inferences. However whether actual
height is necessary to produce these effects was unclear. According
to grounded cognition, modal models of mental representation
that are tied to a perceptual basis not only process sensorimotor
information when a stimulus appears but also reenact the
sensorimotor state when the stimulus disappears [1]. In Experi-
ment 2, we therefore hypothesized that spatial heights information
Higher Height, Higher Ability
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judgments. The other goal of Experiment 2 was to rule out
processing style as an explanation for the observations of
Experiment 1. Since we assigned participants in Experiment 1 to
a meeting room on the different floors to manipulate the
perception of vertical space, it could be argued that the higher
view might have led to a more global processing style compared to
a more local processing style on the lower floor. Indeed, this
variation in processing style seemed to present an additional, and
potentially confounding, factor. We thus attempted to disentangle
this issue in Experiment 2.
Methods
Participants. One hundred and one undergraduates (36
male, 65 female) with a mean age of 19.8 years (range =18–22
yrs) participated in Experiment 2 for course credit. They
completed the experiment in a class setting in groups.
Stimuli and procedure. To manipulate their perceptions of
spatial height, the participants were asked to rate photos before the
knowledge test. The locations where the photos were taken were
either from the eighth floor or the second floor of the same
building as in Experiment 1. Note that when taking these photos,
our camera always focused on the ground to highlight the vertical
altitude. The photos taken at the two different floors thus captured
the same objects. The weather at the time when the photos were
taken was sunny and the outside visibility was good (more than 10
km). To manipulate the processing style, we masked the
background areas in all the photos with gray-black color using
Photoshop soft. As a result, the photos were only clear around the
central object portions of the masked photos. In this way the
attention of the participants was focused on the central object
because the backgrounds were hard to see. Thus these masked
photos should lead to a more local processing style, compared with
normal photos. Consequently, this was a 2 (high spatial height vs.
low spatial height) 62 (local processing style vs. global processing
style) between-subject experimental design.
The participants were randomly divided into four groups of
approximately 25 each. After that, the four groups were directed
to four separate but similar classrooms. Each group responded to
one photo condition. As a cover story, participants were informed
that the experiment consisted of two unrelated parts: the first
involved photo rating and the second was a general knowledge
test. Next, the photos appeared on the classroom projection
screen, and the questionnaires were presented to all participants at
the same time. In the first part of the questionnaire, as a
manipulation check, the participants rated the weather when these
photos were taken (1= very unclear, 9= very clear) and their
liking for these photos (1= not at all, 9= very much) and
estimated the height from the ground to the location where these
photos were taken. In the second part of the questionnaire, the
materials and procedures were identical to those used in
Experiment 1. At the end, the experimenter probed the
participants for suspicion about the purpose of the experiment
and then debriefed them. No participant appeared to be aware of
the purpose of the study.
Manipulation check. As we had expected, participants in
the high height photo group estimated a higher height from the
ground to the location where these photos were taken (M=
38.25 m, SD=39.12 m) than participants in the low height photo
group (M=9.42 m, SD=10.38 m), F (1, 99)=24.95, p,.001.
However no significant differences were found in the weather
condition between the high height photo group (M=6.75, SD=
1.48) and the low height photo group (M=7.22, SD=1.26), F
(1, 99)=2.99, p=.087. Similarly, no significant differences were
found in the participants’ liking for the photos between the high
height photo group (M=5.17, SD=1.26) and the low height photo
group (M=5.16, SD=1.45), F (1, 99)=.001, p=.971.
Results and Discussion
A2 62 ANOVA on the actual number of correct answers
revealed that the main effects were not significant for either spatial
height (Mhigh=5.77, SD=1.41; Mlow=5.98, SD=1.49, F (1, 97)
=.62, p=.432, gp
2=.006) or processing style (Mglobal=5.68,
SD=1.46; Mlocal=6.02, SD=1.43, F (1, 97)=1.44, p=.232,
gp
2=.015), and no significant interaction was found between
them, F (1, 97)=.01, p=.946, gp
2,.001.
As we predicted, a 262 ANOVA on the expect number of
correct answers revealed a significant main effect for spatial height
(Mhigh=5.62, SD=1.75; Mlow=4.43, SD=1.40, F (1, 97)=14.20,
p,.001, gp
2=.128) but no significant effect for either the main
effect of processing style (Mglobal=5.02, SD=1.68; Mlocal=5.05,
SD=1.72, F (1, 97)=.02, p=.885, gp
2,.001) or the interaction
between processing style and spatial height condition, F (1, 97)
=.38, p=.539, gp
2=.004.
Furthermore, we calculated the degree of overconfidence for
each participant by subtracting the actual number from the
expected number. The results turned out to be consistent with our
expectations in that participants in the high height photo group
expressed more confidence in their answers (Mdifference=2.15,
SD=2.16) than participants in the low height photo group
(Mdifference=21.55, SD=1.72). An ANOVA on the score difference
of overconfidence revealed a significant main effect for spatial
height (F (1, 97)=13.33, p,.001, gp
2=.121) but showed non-
significant effects for either processing style (F (1, 97)=1.01,
p=.317, gp
2=.010) or the interaction between processing style
and spatial height condition (F (1, 97)=.21, p=.652, gp
2=.002).
Similarly, an ANOVA on the ranking results supported our
hypothesis. The spatial height main effect was significant, F (1,
97)=4.44, p=.038, gp
2=.044, and participants in the high height
photo group chose higher ranks for themselves (M=53.46%,
SD=15.32%) than participants in the low height photo group
(M=47.55%, SD=12.67%). However neither the main effect of
processing style, F (1, 97)=.06, p=.813, gp
2=.001 nor the
interaction between them, F (1, 97)=.19, p=.660, gp
2=.002 was
significant.
In addition, an ANOVA on the mood states revealed non-
significant effects for spatial height (F (1, 97)=2.79, p=.098,
gp
2=.028), for processing style (F (1, 97)=.01, p=.927, gp
2,.001),
and for the interaction between them (F (1, 97)=1.21, p=.274,
gp
2=.012).
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that actual height is not
necessarily required to produce the effects we observed in
Experiment 1 in that a perception of spatial height, as primed
by photos, can also influence judgments about ability. In addition,
the alternative processing style account, namely that people at
higher positions have more confidence in their ability because
their higher view might result in a more global rather than local
processing style, can be ruled out on the basis of the data from
Experiment 2, which confirmed that self-confidence in the
participants’ judgment did not change as a function of the
processing style.
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 supported our hypothesis that a perception
of spatial height would regulate ability judgment, but they yielded
no information about the underlying reason for the height
manipulation effect. Based on grounded cognition, we proposed
Higher Height, Higher Ability
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effect. Specifically, we argued that because ability is mentally
represented as a vertical dimension, thinking about ability may
involve a mental simulation of space that can be influenced by
vertical spatial information. Experiment 3 was designed to
determine the reasonability of our representational dependence
account. According to the representational dependence concept,
representation of ability should be spatially organized along a
mental vertical line along which a continuum of increasing ability
is perceived. If this is the case, if ability were to be described as
increasing in a downward direction, rather than an upward one by
the rating scale of the questionnaire (see Figures 1 and 2), we
conjectured that the inner mental representation of ability would
be disturbed by the reverse outer physical representation of it, and
thus the effect of spatial heights on ability judgments would be
eliminated or reduced.
Methods
Participants. Ninety-seven undergraduates (31 male, 66
female) with a mean age of 19.6 years (range =18–22 yrs)
participated in Experiment 3 for course credit. They completed
the experiment in a class setting in groups.
Stimuli and procedure. In Experiment 3, we used the same
materials developed in Experiment 2, but with several modifi-
cations. First, since in Experiment 2, the ability judgments did not
change as a function of the processing style, we simply employed
normal photos to prime the perception of spatial heights, and the
masked photos were not used again in Experiment 3. Second,
when participants were asked to mark their positions on the rank-
ing question, the rating scale was arranged vertically rather than
horizontally. More important, participants randomly responded
either to the up-version scale or to the down-version scale, as in
Figures 1 and 2. In addition, to demonstrate clearly that the effects
were independent of their arousal levels, all participants at the end
of the questionnaire indicated their arousal levels during the
experiment on a 9-point scale (1= sleepiness, 9= high arousal).
Experiment 3 also followed the procedure developed in
Experiment 2, except that participants were randomly divided
into two rather than four groups. As a result, 46 participants saw
the low height photos, and the other 51 participants saw the high
height photos. In each photo condition, participants were
randomly presented with questionnaires that had either the up-
version scale or the down-version scale in the ranking question.
Thus, this was a 2 (high spatial height vs. low spatial height) 62
Figure 1. The up-version of the response scale for the ranking
question in Experiment 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022125.g001
Figure 2. The down-version of the response scale for the
ranking question in Experiment 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022125.g002
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mental design. Note that in the questionnaire, the ranking
question appeared later than the number estimation question for
the correct answers, so the participants’ confidence in their
number estimation would have nothing to with the scale direction
manipulation. Thus, for the expected number of correct answers,
we predicted that a significant main effect of spatial height would
exist, as in Experiment 2. For the ranking results, however, we
predicted a significant interaction between spatial height and the
scale version, that is, that the spatial height effect would appear in
the up-version scale but not in the down-version scale.
Manipulation check. As we expected, participants in the
high height photo group estimated a higher height from the
ground to the location where these photos were taken
(M=43.73 m, SD=46.81 m) than did participants in the low
height photo group (M=11.70 m, SD=14.62 m), F (1, 95)
=19.78, p,.001. However, no significant differences were found
in the weather condition between the high height photo group
(M=6.25, SD=1.25) and the low height photo group (M=6.74,
SD=1.37), F (1, 95)=3.31, p=.072. Similarly, no significant
differences in liking the photos were found between the high
height photo group (M=4.86, SD=1.02) and the low height photo
group (M=5.00, SD=1.12), F (1, 95)=.40, p=.528.
Results and Discussion
A2 62 ANOVA on the actual number of correct answers
revealed that the main effects were not significant for either spatial
height (Mhigh=6.02, SD=1.16; Mlow=5.83, SD=1.23, F (1,
93)=.58, p=.448, gp
2=.006) or scale direction (Mup=5.86,
SD=1.35; Mdown=6.00, SD=1.01, F (1, 93)=.38, p=.537,
gp
2=.004), and no significant interaction was detected between
them, F (1, 93)=1.22, p=.272, gp
2=.013.
As we predicted, a 262 ANOVA on the expected number of
correct answers revealed a significant main effect for spatial height
(Mhigh=5.47, SD=1.39; Mlow=4.48, SD=1.85, F (1, 93)=8.75,
p=.004, gp
2=.086), but neither the main effect of scale direction
(Mup=4.80, SD=1.98; Mdown=5.21, SD=1.32, F (1, 93)=1.43,
p=.235, gp
2=.015) nor the interaction between scale direction
and spatial height condition, F (1, 93)=.60, p=.439, gp
2=.006
was significant.
Following Experiments 1 and 2, we calculated the degree of
overconfidence for each participant. Results showed that partic-
ipants in the high height photo group expressed more confidence
in their answers (Mdifference=2.55, SD=1.85) than did participants
in the low height photo group (Mdifference=21.35, SD=2.07). An
ANOVA on the score difference of overconfidence revealed a
marginally significant effect for spatial height (F (1, 93)=3.89,
p=.052, gp
2=.040) but showed non-significant effects for either
scale direction (F (1, 93)=.37, p=.545, gp
2=.004) or the
interaction between scale direction and spatial height condition
(F (1, 93)=.001, p=.974, gp
2,.001).
An ANOVA on the ranking question revealed that the main
effects were not significant for either spatial height (F (1, 93)=1.35,
p=.248, gp
2=.014) or scale direction (F (1, 93)=.03, p=.858,
gp
2,.001). Consistent with our prediction, however, a significant
interaction was found between them, F (1, 93)=5.18, p=.025,
gp
2=.053. Specifically, although participants in the high height
photo group marked higher ranks for themselves than did
participants in the low height photo group for the up-version
scale (Mhigh=57.20%, SD=13.16%; Mlow=47.92%, SD=13.51%,
t (47)=22.44, p=.019 ), no difference was found between the
high height photo group and the low height photo group for the
down-version scale (Mhigh=51.54%, SD=13.47%; Mlow=54.55%,
SD=12.90%, t (46)=.79, p=.44 ).
In addition, an ANOVA on the mood states of the participants
revealed non-significant effects for spatial height (F (1, 93)=3.80,
p=.054, gp
2=.039), for scale direction (F (1, 93)=.84, p=.361,
gp
2=.009), and for the interaction between them (F (1, 93)=.79,
p=.377, gp
2=.008). An ANOVA on the arousal levels revealed
non-significant effects for spatial height (F (1, 93)=.65, p=.423,
gp
2=.007), for scale direction (F (1, 93)=.06, p=.815, gp
2=.001)
and for the interaction between them (F (1, 93)=1.19, p=.279,
gp
2=.013).
Experiment 3 provided further evidence that the perception of
spatial height can influence judgments of ability. More impor-
tantly, Experiment 3 supported representational dependence as a
conceptual underpinning for the observed effects. That is, when
the inner mental representation of ability was disturbed by a
reverse outer physical representation of it (i.e., down-version scale),
the effect of spatial height on ability judgments disappeared; when
the inner mental representation of ability was consistent with its
outer physical representation (i.e., up-version scale), the spatial
height effect appeared. Interestingly, Experiment 3 found a
moderating effect of scale direction only in the ranking question,
but not in the estimated number of correct answers. The
participants had not seen the rating scale when they answered
the number estimation question because the ranking question was
presented after the number estimation question in the question-
naire. Thus, the difference in the results between these two
questions seems to be a valid one which further validates the
sensitivity of our scale direction manipulation. In addition,
Experiment 3 clearly established the independence of these height
effects from mood states and arousal levels.
From this series of experiments, we discovered that judgments
about ability are regulated by perceptions of spatial heights. In
Experiment 1, we showed that people increased their self-
confidence about a knowledge test after seeing the ground from
a higher rather than lower floor. In Experiment 2, we examined
the boundary conditions of the spatial height effects and showed
that it could still occur even if we employed photos rather than
actual building floors to manipulate the perceptions of spatial
heights. Experiment 2 also excluded processing style as an
explanation for our observations. In Experiment 3, we investigated
a potential mechanism for the spatial height effect by manipulating
the scale direction in the questionnaire. Consequently, and
consistent with our representational dependence account, the
effect of spatial height on the participants’ judgments about their
ability was eliminated when the mental representation of ability
was disturbed by its reverse physical representation. To our
knowledge, the present study is the first to suggest that people’s
ability judgment is not independent of spatial perception. These
results are consistent with theories of grounded cognition that have
revealed interesting correspondences between concrete physical
experience and abstract cognition [13–18].
Most relevant to the current study, Meier, Hauser, Robinson,
Friesen, and Schjeldahl (2007) found that inferences related to
divinity relied on vertical representation processes [19]. Schubert
(2005) showed that thinking about power involved a mental
simulation of space and could be interfered with by a perception of
vertical differences [6]. These findings, along with the data
reported in the current study, suggest that spatial height may offer
a communal modal system to support multiple and distinct
concept representations. This communal representation argument
is consistent not only with grounded cognition but also with
metaphor representation processes. Lakoff and Johnson (1999)
pointed out that the human conceptual system is often deemed to
be structured around only a small set of fundamental experiential
concepts, such as space and actions, and all other abstract concepts
Higher Height, Higher Ability
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mappings from these fundamental concepts [2]. Our results
highlight the role of space as a fundamental concept and thus
provide evidence for such a representational dependence view.
Previous researchers found that body height may play a role in
judging other persons’ ability. That is, people tend to regard the
ability of taller persons as higher [20–22]. However, rather than
investigating body height, the present study developed a new
connection between the ability and perceptions of the spatial
height of the occupied site.
In the current study, we clearly showed that ability judgment, as
a psychological variable, can be affected by perceptions of spatial
height. Interestingly, Proffitt (2006) showed conceptually similar
effects in the reverse direction, that is some psychological factors
impacted spatial perception. For example, Proffitt found that
people’s goals in fluenced their distance perceptions [23]. Both the
current finding and Proffitt’s observation challenge the view of
traditional cognition theories that abstract knowledge representa-
tions are separate from modal systems formed by sensorimotor
information and also help to sharpen the understanding of the
fundamental reciprocity that occurs between perceptual interfer-
ence and knowledge accessibility.
In addition, in view of the fact that controlling people’s
perceptions of spatial heights should be a relatively inexpensive
and nonintrusive way to restore the representation of ability, our
findings have important applied implications for promoting
people’s self confidence in previously unexplored ways.
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